

STAT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/19 : CIA-RDP88G01116R001102020008-8

Page Denied

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/19 : CIA-RDP88G01116R001102020008-8

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI -D		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	ER				
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks To 5: As in the case of the previous request (see State letter of 21 Feb 86, ER 0729x), please have appropriate response(s) prepared and forwarded directly to D/INR (with copy to ER)

Executive Secretary

16 Apr 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

Page Denied

Next 15 Page(s) In Document Denied

Washington, D.C. 20505

Executive Registry

86-

07290/1

26 February 1986

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear George,

I appreciate your note telling me about your meeting with Bob Gates and Mike Armacost. I only wish that other officers of the government at your level would spend the time on intelligence. As Bob told you, the more feedback we get, the better.

I think your list of priority concerns is right on the mark. I am having work done on a few of the items where you indicated an interest in having more information now. On the others, you can be sure that they will receive high priority for both collection and analysis.

Thanks for taking the time to send me your thoughts. It's very helpful.

Yours,

Bill

William J. Casey

I expect to have a paper on "new patterns" + "increased fluidity" in diplomatic + political thrusts around the world, which I will try to send over at the end of the week. This is response to questions you raised with me as we walked from one of the family lunches

Bill

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

26 February 1986

The Honorable George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear George,

I appreciate your note telling me about your meeting with Bob Gates and Mike Armacost. I only wish that other officers of the government at your level would spend the time on intelligence. As Bob told you, the more feedback we get, the better.

I think your list of priority concerns is right on the mark. I am having work done on a few of the items where you indicated an interest in having more information now. On the others, you can be sure that they will receive high priority for both collection and analysis.

Thanks for taking the time to send me your thoughts. It's very helpful.

Yours,

Bill

William J. Casey

I expect to have a paper on "new patterns" + "increased fluidity" in diplomatic + political thrusts around the world, which I will try to send over at the end of the week. This is response to questions you raised with me as we walked from one of the family lunches *Bill*

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC		X		
17	ER				
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE

26 Feb 86 (for response to letter)

4 Mar 86 (for requested info)

Remarks

To 5: Please prepare response for DCI signature indicating how concerns will be handled. Then arrange or requested info to be provided, perhaps directly to D/INR.

Executive Secretary

24 Feb 86

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry
86- 0729X

February 21, 1986

SECRET

Dear Bill:

I recently met with Bob Gates, Mike Armacost, and INR, and discussed ways in which the Community could be of more direct support to me. I agreed that for me to get more out of the capabilities of the Community, I needed to devote more of my own time to telling you what would be helpful to me.

To do that, I will send you from time to time a note with items that are of concern to me that do not seem to be adequately addressed. In some cases it may be a matter of collection priorities; in others it may be a need for updated analysis.

Please feel free to share my concerns with the directors of the Community's agencies, as appropriate. Mort Abramowitz and INR can serve as a point of contact for elaborating on my concerns and working with your people on the answers.

My requests, in no particular order, are attached for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director of Central Intelligence Agency.

SECRET
DECL: OADR



C-249

~~SECRET~~

1. My Trip to Europe: Are there any surprises planned for me by any of the West European governments that I will be visiting in March? In particular, what can I expect out of Papandreou?

2. Domestic Situation in Libya: As we develop our policy on how to continue pressuring Qadhafi, it would be helpful to know what effect our moves to date have had and how secure Qadhafi is at home. There seems to be a shortage of reporting on domestic attitudes toward Qadhafi in Libya, both military and civilian. We see occasional HUMINT reports, but it is impossible to draw much of a reliable picture from them.

3. Can Iraq Hold? The recent Iranian offensive raises again the question of Iraq's ability to react to setbacks and our need for contingency plans to deal with an Iraqi collapse. Once again, we see occasional HUMINT reports of the morale of the Iraqi army and its attitude toward the war, but I do not have a good understanding of whether the Iraqi army's morale could withstand a major military defeat. I also have some difficulty understanding why the Iraqis do not do better on the battlefield. Do we have a good feel for this situation? Changes here can affect our whole Middle East diplomacy.

4. Will Sudan Transition Peacefully? The situation in the Sudan is unstable and the potential for adverse developments seems high. I understand that there is a SNIE in preparation on the Sudan and the prospects for a successful transition to a moderate elected government. During this preelection period, I think we need as much collection as possible on possible coups, Libyan activity, and non-moderate factions.

5. Is India Going Nuclear? We have been trying to use the window of Rajiv's first few months to encourage an Indian-Pakistani dialogue, including the nuclear issue. Thus I am concerned with recent indications of a shift on the desirability of weaponizing. This prospect should be a high collection priority.

6. Is the Soviet SDI Program Getting a Lift? As we develop our arms control strategy, we need to take into account what the Soviets are doing with their strategic forces budget. There were reports that Gorbachev was under pressure from his military to increase funding for SDI and counter-SDI programs before the Summit. Can we tell if he has increased funding in these areas since the Summit?

7. Whereabouts of Terrorists: I know that it is already a priority to locate terrorist leaders and those who have committed acts against Americans. Obviously, we need to keep this as a high priority.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

SECRET

-2-

8. Central America: So far we lack hard information on the thinking of the new Central American governments with respect to Nicaragua, including their attitudes toward the contras, of particular importance with respect to Honduras, which has shown a capacity to surprise us. We also lack sufficient intelligence on the progress of the war in Nicaragua.

9. Reaction to Tech Transfer: An analysis of the ways in which countries are reacting to our stricter attitudes on technology transfer and COCOM enforcement could be valuable, i.e., are there ways in which they are circumventing through projects that appear not to use US components; are they avoiding collaboration with US firms?

10. Exploiting Soviet Troubles in the Middle East: Clearly events in the PDRY have been something of a disaster for the Soviets. The countries of the area are much more sensitive to the threat of Soviet meddling. Are there opportunities for exploiting this situation that we may be overlooking?

11. Syria: Assad's health is an uncertain factor. We don't know how long he will be with us. Is his departure from the scene likely to hurt or help our efforts in the Middle East?

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied